This paper analyzes DRM-based technological tying, where the content and hardware form a system. A closed DRM system makes the legal content incompatible with a rival's hardware, whose users must then obtain illegal copies. The main finding is that the tying firm gains market power in a competitive hardware market and invests in product upgrades at a later stage. Welfare implications of the policy that requires an open DRM system are also discussed.
Introduction
Digital Rights Management (DRM) refers to encryption technologies that can restrict access to protected content distributed via the Internet or other digital media (e.g., music, movies, software) so that those without proper authentication cannot access it. It has become a popular solution for content industries in an attempt to fight consumer piracy, but its restrictive nature has been a controversial subject. 1 Given that DRM technologies have been constantly hacked, it seems that there is no clear-cut evidence that a DRM system is an effective tool for reducing consumer piracy.
For example, a DRM system can be used to increase the content firm's indirect appropriability (Liebowitz 1985) . That is, a firm can indirectly charge copying consumers by increasing the initial price of the original units. If the DRM system decreases the supply of illegal copies, then the firm may be able to charge higher initial prices. However, a crucial condition for this is that competition among the sellers of copies should not drive down the price of copies to zero. 2 Given that current prices of copies are basically zero, this argument does not seem to be the main reason for the use of a DRM system.
Rather, a DRM system can be a tool for strategic tying. For example, since its inception in 2001, the iPod has become the fastest selling music player in history. Its U.S. market share reached over 80 percent among hard-drive-based portable music players by 2004, and its online retail counterpart, the iTunes Store, also accounted for more than 80 percent of U.S. digital music sales. 3 Apple's success is often attributed to the exclusive nature of its proprietary DRM system, known as "FairPlay." That is, competing devices cannot play protected content bought from the iTunes Store, but only plain MP3 files.
Before Apple launched the iPod, the market for portable music players was small, and there was no dominant firm in this market. Big record labels were uncomfortable with the idea of selling MP3 music online because the majority of MP3 files were illegal copies, and, as in the Napster lawsuit, they regarded MP3 files as something that needed to be eliminated. 4 Thus, labels needed encryption technology to make sure that their legal content could not be easily copied. Apple successfully persuaded the big labels to sell their music using its DRM technology, and then Apple did not share its DRM information with its competitors.
When the iPod market took off, there were a couple of alternative DRM technologies.
However, they could not seriously challenge Apple's strategy. Microsoft's Windows Media Audio format was mainly used for personal computers, and it used a subscription mechanism to control copyrights, which consumers did not like. 5 Sony's Adaptive Transform Acoustic
Coding system was not subscription based, but, unlike the iPod, Sony's devices did not support MP3 files, which is one of the main reasons for Sony's failure in this market. 6 More serious challenges, like Microsoft's Zune, came only after Apple already dominated the 3 These numbers are from the NPD Group. See, for example, Guglielmo, Connie, "Apple's Jobs Taps Teen iPod Demand to Fuel Sales, Stock Surge," Bloomberg, October 11, 2007 ; Evans, Jonny, "Apple Discusses Growing iPod Marketshare," Macworld, April 20, 2006 . 4 Only recently have the labels become positive about selling MP3 files through such online stores as Amazon.com, which was launched in 2007. 5 Except for Napster and a few others, most of the online stores (e.g., AOL, Yahoo, MTV, MSN, Musicmatch) that used a subscription mechanism are now closed. 6 Sony finally phased out its ATRAC system in 2008 and introduced a new Walkman series that supports plain MP3 files.
market.
Therefore, it seems plausible that Apple has benefited from technologically tying DRMprotected content to its hardware, making competing devices incompatible with the legal content. This strategic use of DRM systems coincides with some real world observations. For example, Apple's CEO Steve Jobs has publicly opposed licensing its FairPlay to competitors. 7 In addition, Microsoft launched its new portable music player, Zune, which like the iPod is the only portable music player that can play the protected content bought from its counterpart online store, Zune Marketplace. 8 This paper analyzes the effects of DRM-based technological tying. When there are competing devices, or content players, as well as copyrighted content, the hardware seller who owns a DRM technology may have an incentive to make the consumer's hardware choice depend on whether the consumer would buy legal content or obtain illegal copies. By making the rival's device incompatible with DRM-protected legal content, the tying firm can force consumers to obtain illegal copies in order to use the rival's device. That is, the tying firm can effectively increase the cost of using the rival's system.
To understand the basic logic for our finding, we begin with a simple static model with homogeneous consumers. We show that, in a market of competitive hardware devices, the firm that owns a proprietary DRM technology can monopolize the market by tying the protected legal content to its hardware. That is, a closed DRM system emerges in equilibrium 7 In an open letter on DRM, Steve Jobs (2007) argued that "if it licenses FairPlay to others, it can no longer guarantee to protect the music it licenses" because the DRM information must be shared by more companies, making it more difficult to protect the secret codes from hackers. 8 Although Microsoft previously developed and licensed the "PlaysForSure" DRM system to alternative hardware sellers such as SanDisk and Samsung, ironically, the new Zune player is not compatible with PlaysForSure-certified content.
when the tying firm refuses to share its DRM system with the competitors. We also show that, if the government requires a closed DRM system to be opened, it can increase consumer surplus, but it would not affect overall social welfare.
We then develop two separate analyses to show that the above welfare implications can break down in the presence of consumer heterogeneity and product upgrades. In the former case, the basic intuition is the same as in the first analysis, but there is efficiency loss under a closed DRM system because high prices lead to monopoly deadweight loss. In the latter case, we find that DRM-based tying can also deprive the rival of an incentive to invest in product upgrades at a later stage. However, there can be a dynamic efficiency gain under a closed DRM system because, for example, it prevents duplicating investments in innovation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 lays out the basic model, and section 4 analyzes this model. Section 5 introduces heterogeneous consumers, and section 6 extends the basic model to a two-period setting where products can be upgraded. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
The economics literature on copyright issues has a long history and variety of theoretical and empirical research (see, e.g., Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) for a survey). There are broadly two types of copyright protection available to the owners of copyrighted goods. One is government-enfored legislation, and the other is private, technological measures. Early literature (e.g., Novos and Waldman 1984, Johnson 1985) focuses on public copyright protection and finds that copyright protection generally enhances social welfare. 9 Recently, there has been growing attention to private copyright protection.
For example, Park and Scotchmer (2005) examine the effects on pricing and collusion of the use of DRM systems. They assume that content providers can deploy a DRM system and share the fixed cost of the system. They find that a shared DRM system can facilitate collusion via cost sharing, while separate systems are less vulnerable to hacking attacks, so that sellers feel less pressure to keep prices low. In this paper, we relax one of their assumptions by considering a complementary hardware seller who owns a proprietary DRM technology and decides whether or not to share it with a rival.
Bergemann et al. (2005) posit that the optimal level of DRM protection trades off the user's disutility from DRM restrictions and the risk that illegal copies may circulate. They conclude that the content provider who also sells a device prefers a less stringent DRM system than one who only sells content. Sundararajan (2004) similarly finds that a content seller chooses a lower level of DRM protection when it can price discriminate. The current paper is different in that we consider two competing devices and focus on the tying aspect of DRM protection and its policy implications.
There is an extensive literature on tying. The traditional Chicago School argument is that a monopolist with an essential good has no incentive to tie because it can extract all the potential surplus by charging a monopoly price (e.g., Posner 1976 , Bork 1978 Most similar to our findings, Whinston (1990) shows that, when there exists an inferior substitute for the primary good, the monopolist has an incentive to tie in order to make the alternative primary good unusable, and this increases the monopolist's profit. Similarly, in this paper, the hardware firm that owns a proprietary DRM technology has an incentive to tie the legal content to its own hardware, so that the competing devices can only work with illegal copies. An important difference is that in our paper the hardware firms have identical products, whereas in Whinston's paper the tying firm has a superior primary product.
There are a couple of differences between the literature on tying and the current paper.
Whereas the tying literature focuses on a firm that ties two goods of its own, in reality a firm need not own both goods in order to tie. That is, technological advancements allow a new class of tying, where a firm virtually ties another firm's good to its own good by deploying proprietary technology. This paper also addresses technological tying in the context of a digital economy, where consumer copying is an important issue. Thus, the current paper is an attempt to combine the separate literatures on tying and copying.
Finally, there are other related works on compatibility. For example, Church and Gandal (2000) show that an integrated software-hardware firm has an incentive to make its software incompatible with the competing hardware. Katz and Shapiro (1985) show that in a market with network externalities a dominant firm might prefer a technological design that is in- 10 There is growing attention to the effects of tying on R&D incentives. Carlton and Waldman (2005b) show that the monopolist can tie in order to capture profits when products are upgraded. Gilbert and Riordan (2007) similarly find that, when tying decreases the quality of the rival's system, the monopolist can foreclose the rival and upgrade its product. compatible with the rival's. The current paper shows that vertical integration and network externalities are not necessary for systems incompatibilities to be exploited by the firm that owns the key technology.
The Model
There are two firms (j = A, B) that sell hardware devices, which consumers need in order to play digital content. There is a single content firm, call it firm C, that sells the content and owns its copyright. 11 Both hardware devices are produced at a constant marginal cost of c, and the content is produced at zero marginal cost. The content is subject to consumer piracy in the sense that consumers can obtain illegal copies at zero marginal cost in the absence of a DRM system. That is, there are two versions of content; one we refer to as "legal content"
and the other "illegal copies."
Suppose that firm A owns a proprietary DRM technology that can encrypt digital content.
Thus, we abstract from the initial investment in DRM technology. With DRM-protected content, it is harder to make illegal copies, thus it increases the consumer's copying cost from zero to h, h > 0. When the legal content is protected by a DRM system, firm A's hardware is by design compatible with it. However, firm B's hardware is compatible with the protected content only if firm A shares its DRM system with firm B. Illegal copies, however, are DRM-stripped, thus they are compatible with both firms' hardware.
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There is a continuum of identical individuals with unit measure, who derive utility from consuming a system composed of hardware and content; that is, there is no stand-alone value when a consumer buys only one component. Let u j = δ − e − p j denote the consumer's utility when he chooses a system including hardware j, where δ is the value of the content, e is the cost of obtaining the content, and p j is the price of hardware j. Consumers have a reservation utility of zero, and they buy at most one hardware device and either buy or copy the content.
The copies are imperfect substitutes for the legal content because, for example, the copies are of lower quality and customer service is not available to them. Thus, the consumer's valuation for legally purchased content is δ = v, whereas the valuation for illegally obtained copies is lower; that is, δ = v − ∆, where ∆ > 0. 13 We assume that the consumer valuation is high enough, v > h + ∆ + c, to ensure interior solutions, which in particular means that DRM protection itself does not eliminate the possibility of consumer copying.
Let ρ denote the market price of the legal content. Accordingly, when a consumer buys legal content, e = ρ. However, when he obtains illegal copies, e = 0 if the legal content is DRM free, and e = h if it is DRM protected. 14 The two hardware devices are homogeneous other than the (in)compatibility issue related to the use of DRM, and firms engage in Bertrand competition when more than one firm is active. When indifferent, consumers choose between hardware A and B with equal probability. Finally, let π j=A(B) and σ j=A(B)
denote firm A(B)'s profit and market share, respectively. 13 An alternative interpretation of ∆ is that it represents extra time cost involved in making copies versus buying legal content.
14 One can refine the model such that, when legal content is DRM protected, consumers can make copies of legal content at a cost ofh or simply download illegal copies at a cost of h. However, if the cost involved in making copies from DRM-protected content,h, is higher than the cost of downloading illegal copies, h, then the analysis would remain the same because consumers would choose the latter option to obtain illegal copies. Note further, if ∆ represents a time cost as discussed in footnote 13, then one should interpret h and h as the cost of copying which is in addition to ∆.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, firm A can offer to share its DRM technology with firm C if firm C sells the legal content at someρ. 15 If firm C rejects the offer, then the second stage ensues. If firm C accepts the offer, then firm A can offer to share its DRM technology with firm B, and firm B accepts or rejects the offer. 16 In the second stage, all firms set their prices simultaneously subject to any contractual terms, and consumers make their consumption choices. The solution concept throughout this paper is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
Analysis
Since the model is solved backwards, we first solve for equilibrium in the second stage. Note that the consumer choices are any of the five possible options: {A,buy},{A,copy},{B,buy}, {B,copy},{Ø,Ø}, where for each pairing the first element is the hardware choice and the second element is the method of obtaining the content, and {Ø,Ø} represents abstention.
system, a closed DRM system, and an open DRM system at the beginning of the second stage.
First, if there is no DRM system, the choices are {{A,buy}, {A,copy}, {B,buy}, {B,copy}, {Ø,Ø}}, where both bought and copied content are of the same kind for owners of hardware A or B.
Here, we show that in equilibrium firm A and firm B split the market and legal content is bought.
Second, we look at a "closed DRM system" where not all five choices are available. The choice set for the consumer is {{A,buy}, {A,copy}, {B,copy}, {Ø,Ø}}. That is, the choice of buying legal content for hardware B, {B,buy}, is not available since the legal content is not compatible with hardware B. Here, we show that in equilibrium only hardware A is purchased together with legal content; that is, {A,buy} in the choice set.
Third, we look at an "open DRM system," which again allows for all five elements. The bought content for hardware A is identical to that for hardware B in this case. Here, we
show that in equilibrium firm A and firm B split the market, and legal content is bought.
The no DRM case can be thought of as a benchmark, and we look at the second and third cases, where it is assumed that firm A owns the DRM technology and selects to either use it for only hardware A or to use it for both hardware A and B.
We show that in the first-stage equilibrium of our basic model this leads to DRM protection compatible only with hardware A (a closed DRM system), the second case. In the above, note that in none of the three possible cases, including the equilibrium case, is there any use of illegally copied content. This is because consumers have identical copying costs.
A model with heterogeneous copying costs would have illegal copies in equilibrium, however this complicates the analysis. In the next section, we consider heterogeneous consumer valuations, which yield similar intuition, but is simpler than the case of heterogeneous copying costs.
No DRM
In this case, hardware A and B are functionally identical in that both play legal content as well as illegal copies. Thus, given any price for the legal content, whether consumers buy or copy, firm A and B would engage in standard Bertrand competition, which drives their prices down to marginal cost, p A = p B = c. Firm A's and B's profits are zero, and they would have equal market shares,
.
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On the other hand, firm C faces competition from illegal copies, which can be obtained at zero cost. However, firm C's original content is of superior quality, so that consumers would be willing to buy the content as long as the price is not too high; that is, as long as the market price of the legal content, ρ, is less than its superior quality, ∆. Since firm C can charge ρ = ∆ − without loss of generality, all consumers buy legal content in equilibrium at ρ = ∆, and firm C's profit is ∆.
Closed DRM
In this case, firm C accepts firm A's offer in the first stage, so the content price must be set by the terms of the contract, ρ =ρ. That is, for the second stage, we takeρ as a given, and later when solving for the first stage we substitute the equilibrium value ofρ. Since hardware B is by design incompatible with the legal content, consumers must obtain illegal copies in order to use hardware B. This means that the utility from choosing hardware B 19 To be more specific and as mentioned earlier, when a consumer is indifferent, each individual randomizes between hardware A and B with a probability of 
On the other hand, hardware A is compatible with both legal content and illegal copies, so the consumer's utility is u A = v −ρ − p A if he buys, and
At the beginning of the second stage, firm A and firm B compete by setting prices, given ρ =ρ. There are two cases to consider. First, supposeρ < ∆ + h. In this subcase, the utility from {A,buy} is higher than the utility from {A,copy}. Thus, consumers consider only two options: {A,buy} and {B,copy}.
B has an incentive to undercut p A to make any sales. Given this Bertrand-like competition, p B = c in equilibrium. Then, firm A would set p A equal (or below) to the level where consumers would be indifferent between {A,buy} and {B,copy}; that is,
Second, supposeρ ≥ ∆ + h. In this subcase, the utility from {A,copy} is higher than the utility from {A,buy}. Thus, the relevant options for the consumers are {A,copy} and {B,copy}. This means that consumers do not buy legal content, and firm A and B would engage in standard Bertrand competition, so that p A = p B = c, and
. Intuitively, it does not matter if the DRM system is open or closed if the legal content price is set too high relative to the disadvantages of illegal copies (i.e., ∆ + h).
Open DRM
In this case, the content price must again be set by the terms of firm A's offer to firm C in the first stage; that is, ρ =ρ. Note that under an open DRM system both hardware devices are compatible with the legal content as well as illegal copies. This means that holding the consumer's decision to buy or copy fixed, firm A and B must compete in Bertrand fashion. This would drive down the prices again to marginal cost; that is, p A = p B = c, and
. On the other hand, given p A = p B = c and some price of legal content,ρ, consumers would buy the content ifρ < ∆ + h, or obtain illegal copies ifρ ≥ ∆ + h.
Equilibrium
Knowing the payoffs in each of the three possible subgames, which also depends on whether ρ < ∆ + h orρ ≥ ∆ + h, we now solve for equilibrium in the first stage. First, suppose that firm C has accepted firm A's offer, and subsequently firm A makes an offer to firm B to share its DRM technology at no cost. Since firm B earns zero profit whether the DRM system is open or closed and whetherρ < ∆ + h or not, firm B is indifferent as to accepting or rejecting firm A's offer. However, firm A earns a strictly positive profit under a closed DRM system ifρ < ∆ + h, whereas it earns zero profit under an open DRM system. Assuming a tie-breaking condition that firm B would accept firm A's offer when indifferent, forρ < ∆+h, firm A would never offer to share its DRM technology with firm B. 20 On the other hand, if ρ ≥ ∆ + h, then firm A earns zero profit under both a closed and an open DRM system.
Thus, forρ ≥ ∆ + h, firm A would be indifferent as to sharing its DRM technology with
As discussed earlier in footnote 16, this can explain why we refer to "sharing" instead of "licensing" the DRM technology. The reason is that firm B would never accept any licensing deal that has a positive royalty fee, so the terminology is without loss of generality. Under an open system, firm B would earn zero profit. Thus, if firm A were to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to firm B at a royalty fee per unit sold, then the only deal that firm B would accept is when the licensing fee is nonpositive. Clearly, firm A has no incentive to license at a cost, so the licensing if it occurs must be at zero royalty. To reduce the number of variables, we abstract from a royalty fee and use the terminology "sharing a DRM system," which can be interpreted as licensing for free.
Second, knowing that it would earn a strictly positive profit by refusing to share its DRM technology with firm B whenρ < ∆ + h, firm A indeed has an incentive to make an offer to firm C conditional on firm C setting the content price at someρ < ∆ + h. Note that firm A earns zero profit under no DRM system, and, forρ ≥ ∆ + h, firm A would be indifferent about making an offer to firm C because its profit would be zero in any case. On the other hand, under no DRM system, firm C is already making a positive profit, ∆. Thus, firm A must offer a content price,ρ, to be greater or equal to ∆ in order to have firm C accept its offer. Since firm A's profit is decreasing inρ,ρ would equal ∆, and firm C would accept firm A's offer. Since p A = ∆ + h −ρ + c from the second-stage equilibrium under a closed DRM system, by substitutingρ = ∆, firm A's hardware price is p A = h + c, and its profit is h. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
There is a unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium: In the first stage, firm A offers its DRM technology to firm C and sets the content price atρ = ∆; firm C accepts the offer. Firm A does not make an offer to share its DRM technology with firm B.
In the second stage, the hardware firms set their prices at p A = h + c and p B = c, and the content price is ρ = ∆. All consumers choose hardware A and buy the legal content.
Proof. Proof follows immediately from the above. Q.E.D.
This result is consistent with Whinston (1990) , who shows that a monopolist may have a strategic incentive to tie in order to foreclose the rival's sales by tying its complementary good to its primary good. This is because the presence of alternative inferior substitutes constrains the monopolist's pricing and profit. In this paper, although the two hardware products are initially the same quality, the firm with access to DRM has a similar incentive to tie the legal content to its hardware by deploying a closed DRM system. The reason is that, in the absence of a tie, the rival's product is also compatible with the legal content, so that Bertrand price competition would lead to a zero profit for firm A.
However, we have not discussed yet whether this is anticompetitive conduct or an antitrust violation. The courts typically draw the line between unlawful exclusion and competition by looking at the (in)efficiency of exclusionary conduct. There have been growing concerns regarding Apple's iPod/iTunes tying, and a number of consumer groups in Europe and the U.S. have filed class action lawsuits against Apple. In response, some European countries have considered antitrust suits and government intervention that would require Apple to share its DRM technology with competitors. 21 In the next section, we analyze the model's welfare implications of such "open" policies. 21 In 2006, the French National Assembly passed a bill that could force Apple to give its rivals access to its DRM technology. However, the Senate subsequently passed a watered-down bill that dropped key provisions on the interoperability requirements. The new French law retains some interoperability requirement, but it exempts cases when the copyright owners agree to such closed systems.
Policy Implications
The above subsection shows the possibility that a firm can become a monopolist in a homogeneous goods market by having complementary content encrypted in its proprietary DRM format and refusing to share it with competitors. In response to anticompetitive concerns, the government may consider a policy intervention to open a closed DRM system. However, regulation typically does not restrict contractual agreements, especially, the terms that firm A would require in order for firm C to use its DRM technology. This means that even if the government forces a switch to an open system the content price should still be set by the contractual terms, which do not change in equilibrium; that is, ρ =ρ = ∆.
Given this, it turns out that firm B is indifferent between requesting or not requesting firm
A to disclose its DRM information because firm B's profit is zero under an open as well as a closed DRM system. Thus, even if the government intervenes by requiring firm A to share its DRM technology with any firms that ask for it, firm B may not be interested in switching to an open system. In reality, however, if hardware were horizontally differentiated, then firm B could make a strictly positive profit under an open DRM system whereas it could be eliminated under a closed DRM system. Thus, in reality, firm B might prefer to ask firm A to share its DRM technology.
However, there is another factor that might work just the opposite way. Since firm A loses all of its monopoly profit if it is forced to open its DRM system, it is realistic to expect that firm B is able to claim a part of the monopoly profit from firm A in return for not asking to share its DRM technology. That is, following government intervention, if we were to allow firm A to make a side payment to firm B on the condition that firm B does not request an open DRM system, then the policy would not lead to a switch to an open DRM system. Rather, depending on the bargaining protocol, the monopoly profit is simply redistributed between firm A and firm B.
One may also consider a stronger policy, like the bill passed by the French Assembly in 2006, where the government mandates that a DRM system must be open, so that any hardware device is compatible with the legal content. However, as it turns out, this open policy has no effect on social welfare either, when social welfare is defined as the sum of all firms' profits and the consumers' surplus. That is, social welfare under a closed and an open DRM system is the same because by switching to an open DRM system firm A's profit drops to zero, whereas the consumer surplus increases by exactly the same amount. 
Q.E.D.
To summarize our findings, firm A earns a positive profit only under a closed DRM system, whereas the consumer surplus is the lowest under a closed DRM system. The content firm is able to earn a positive profit, ∆, to the extent that the original content is of superior quality than copies. Also, firm A is able to extract monopoly profit under a closed DRM system to the extent that DRM protection increases the consumer's copying cost from zero to h. Finally, government regulation to open a closed DRM system has no effect on aggregate social welfare. However, consumers are better off under an open DRM system, whereas firm A loses all the profits it could have made with a closed DRM system.
Although intuitive, some of these results seem a little stark and may be true only in special cases. In particular, the result that social welfare is the same under a closed and an open DRM system even though firm A monopolizes the market under a closed DRM system is likely due to the nature of unit demand, where firms sell either all or nothing.
Since consumers are identical, the firm is facing a horizontal demand curve. In the next section, we introduce consumer heterogeneity to identify the source of inefficiency under a closed DRM system. This also generates additional predictions that better match real world markets.
Heterogeneous Consumers
Consider the same model as in the previous section. The only difference is that consumers Second, under a closed DRM system, consumers who choose hardware B must also obtain illegal copies. Note that the legal content price is set by the contract at someρ demanded by firm A, which could be a different value than theρ in the previous section. Again, there are two cases to consider, but let us focus on the equilibrium path; that is,ρ ≤ ∆ + h.
Since active consumers compare the utilities from the two choices, {A,buy} and {B,copy}, following the same logic as before, it is immediate that firm A monopolizes the market and sets p A = ∆ + h −ρ + c > c. However, the important difference between the two models comes from the first-stage offer. To be specific, whereasρ = ∆ in the basic model,ρ > ∆ in this extended model.
The reason why firm A needs to offer firm C better terms forρ in the first stage than before is because firm A monopolizes the market and sells its hardware at a higher price than marginal cost, which means more individuals would abstain from consuming at all. This in turn reduces firm C's profit for a given price. Thus, firm A cannot induce firm C to adopt its DRM technology by offeringρ = ∆ since firm C's profit would be smaller compared to that under no DRM protection. The result is that the content price must go up (i.e.,ρ > ∆) under a closed DRM system when consumers have different valuation, and more consumers Proof. Since ρ = ∆ due to copying constraints, firm C's profit under no DRM system is ∆(
). Since firm A can make a positive profit only under a closed DRM system, it has an incentive to have firm C adopt its DRM technology. To do so, firm A must offerρ such that it would yield at least as large a profit for firm C under a closed DRM system as under no DRM system. Under a closed DRM system, p A = ∆ + h −ρ + c, and
) under a closed DRM system. By Under an open DRM system, firm A's and firm B's profits are zero, and firm C's profit isρ(
), firm B's profit is zero, and firm C's profit isρ(
and
The above proposition shows that there is a source of inefficiency under a closed DRM system when we allow consumers to have different valuations. This inefficiency arises because legal content as well as hardware devices are priced above the competitive level under a closed DRM system. This welfare result is intuitive because with heterogeneous consumers the demand curve firm A is facing would be downward sloping, not horizontal as in the basic model. This means that there is a monopoly deadweight loss under a closed DRM system.
Thus, social welfare increases by switching to an open DRM system. 22 Another implication from the above findings is that there could be a conflict of interest between the content firm and the compatible device seller. That is, whereas firm A prefers to keep its DRM system closed by refusing to share it with firm B, firm C might actually prefer an open DRM, especially when it is achieved through ex post government regulation, because it can sell the content at a profit to a larger population of consumers including those who have previously abstained from consumption. 23 That is, firm A initially has to guarantee a higher content price (i.e.,ρ > ∆) to build a closed DRM system, but later firm C has an incentive to demand an open DRM system to increase its own profit.
This seems consistent with some real world observations. For example, Warner Music CEO Edgar Bronfman criticized Apple's refusal to share its DRM technology with competing device sellers, and the Recording Industry Association of America urged Apple to open its DRM system to competitors. 24 Similarly, in the growing market for electronic publishing, anticircumvention measures are effectively tying a publisher's encrypted e-book formats to a particular e-book reader. The result being that there are some efforts by the Open eBook Forum to develop an e-book format using an encryption technology with only open standards.
One final comment concerns the idea that DRM-based tying can be anticompetitive conduct. Antitrust authorities should be cautious because it may be difficult to prove that this tying arrangement is actually damaging social welfare. 25 While the analysis in this section shows a case where this is a theoretical possibility, we have not considered potential efficiency gains associated with a closed DRM system. As U.S. courts acknowledge in the Microsoft 23 However, if the regulation is perfectly foreseen at the beginning of the game, then firm C would not have an ex ante preference for an open DRM system over a closed one. This is because if a DRM system must be open, firm A has no reason to initially offer its system to firm C on termsρ > ∆, so thatρ must equal ∆, in which case firm C would make the same profits both under a closed and an open DRM system. 24 See, for example, Berlind, David, "Jobs Drowning in His Own Kupertino Kool-Aid," ZDNet, 6 Product Upgrades
The Model
In this section, we extend the basic model into a two-period setting, which is based on Carlton and Waldman (2005b), where at the beginning of the second period the two hardware firms can invest to upgrade their product's quality. The difference is that in Carlton and Waldman (2005b) the tying firm is a monopolist in the primary market, whereas in our model the tying firm is not a monopolist when there is no DRM protection or the DRM technology is shared by the two hardware firms. Another difference is that in their paper the alternative producer's 26 In March 2008, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission issued a staff report that says, "the challenge for the FTC, then, is not to ensure that products are interoperable, but rather to ensure that consumers are provided sufficient information prior to purchase so that they understand any inherent limitations on the use of the products they buy." complementary product is higher quality, whereas in our model they are the same quality.
The upgraded hardware is identical to the original except for the extra quality improvement (e.g., product design, additional features, and larger memory). In particular, an upgraded product can also play DRM-protected content as long as its previous version could.
To illustrate what this means in our model, suppose that a closed DRM system is in place.
Then, an individual who bought the legal content in the first period would prefer to buy an upgraded product from firm A rather than from firm B, all other things being equal. This is because, if the consumer switches to firm B's upgraded product, he incurs an additional cost to obtain illegal copies.
To be more precise, suppose that at the beginning of the second period each firm has the option of investing a fixed amount R, R > 0, to produce at a marginal cost of c an upgraded product whose quality is higher than the previous version by λ > 0. An investment is socially desirable when the benefits from innovation are larger than the costs; that is, λq > R + cq, where q is the quantity sold. In particular, we assume λ > R + c, which ensures that each firm's investment is efficient when all consumers purchase the firm's upgrade in the second period (i.e., q = 1). Firms sell their upgrades by setting a pricep j=A,B , and they engage in Bertrand competition when more than one firm is active. Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), we allow firms to charge different prices to their previous customers and to new customers.
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A consumer's utility from buying an upgrade from firm j in the second period isû j = δ − e −p j + λ, where δ and e are the same as in the basic model. That is, δ is the value of the content, e is the cost of obtaining the content, where e = 0 if one uses the content obtained in the first period. The consumer's valuation for legally purchased content is δ = v, whereas the valuation for illegally obtained copies is lower; that is, δ = v − ∆. We assume that v is again a constant. As before, let ρ denote the market price of the legal content, so that when a consumer buys legal content, e = ρ, but when he obtains illegal copies, e = 0 if the legal content is DRM free, and e = h if it is DRM protected.
The hardware and the content purchased in the first period are durable goods, so that the utility from continuing to use them becomes the new reservation utility in the second period. That is, consumers do not have to purchase new hardware and content again, and they buy at most one upgraded hardware product. Thus, the reservation utility of those who own legal content and hardware to play it on is v, whereas it is v − ∆ for those who own illegal copies and hardware. This means that firm A and B are effectively selling their quality improvement, λ, associated with the upgrades in the second period subject to any switching costs.
To keep the analysis simple, we assume that there are no new customers, content, or entry of new firms in the second period, and firms cannot price below marginal cost in the first period. 28 In addition, we restrict attention to a parameterization, ∆ + h > R, to reduce the number of cases that need to be considered. This means that, when both firms are active under a closed DRM system, firm A can invest in the second period and earn a positive second-period profit if its first-period market share is large enough. As we shall show, ∆ +h are the switching costs in the model, so the interpretation is that the investment cost is smaller than the switching costs. 29 Finally, we assume no discounting between the two periods by either firms or consumers.
Analysis
Two results follow from this extended model given our assumptions. One is that there is a unique equilibrium in which a closed DRM system emerges in the first period, and only The equilibrium in the second period can be found by looking at the payoff matrices constructed from above. Under a closed DRM system, if both firms invest, then firm B cannot make any profit because its price is driven down to marginal cost in both submarkets.
However, firm A can make a positive profit from selling to its previous customers (i.e., Note that firm A's profit is the largest with a closed DRM system in the first period, in which case firm A monopolizes the first-period market (i.e., σ A = 1). Also, note that firm C would accept the offer from firm A on termsρ = ∆ because by doing so it can sell the legal content to all consumers, which is a durable good. Thus, the equilibrium description in the first period is exactly the same as in proposition 1, and in the second period firm A alone invests and sells its upgrade to all consumers. The proof of the second result on social welfare is as explained in the text. Q.E.D.
The above proposition shows a case for dynamic efficiency gains from keeping a closed DRM system in place. This means that, even though the closed DRM system may have a negative effect on social welfare in the first period due to the deadweight loss it creates, DRMbased tying can be beneficial in the second period by avoiding coordination failure between the two firms in a mixed strategy equilibrium. That is, a closed DRM system basically makes the tying firm the next period's innovating firm. However, an open policy can have a positive effect on social welfare in the second period if firm B were to produce a higher quality upgrade, and the equilibrium is chosen such that only firm B invests. Therefore, overall welfare implications are ambiguous.
Conclusion
DRM-based tying has become an important issue in today's digital economy. While the literature has focused on traditional tying arrangements, technological tying wherein a firm ties another firm's good to its own good using its key technology has not received much attention. In this paper, we investigate whether DRM-based tying has the effect of gaining market power and whether the government can increase social welfare by requiring an open DRM system. Although exemplified by Apple's iPod/iTunes tying, such a tying strategy can emerge in other markets too. For example, Apple seems to be extending its DRM-based tying into the smartphone market, where Apple sells DRM-protected applications for its iPhone, which are incompatible with competing phones.
In line with the previous literature on tying, we find that the hardware firm that owns DRM technology has an incentive to tie the legal content to its hardware based on its DRM technology. This increases the tying firm's profits above the competitive level because users of the rival's hardware must obtain illegal copies, which is costly when the content is DRMprotected. This could explain how Apple's iPod became dominant in the portable music player market. We also find that in a static setting such tying may have a negative effect on social welfare due to deadweight losses, but in a dynamic setting social welfare can be higher under a closed DRM system even though it appears to turn a possible duopoly into a monopoly.
More work needs to be done before using antitrust to attack this type of technology-based tying. For example, DRM-based tying is effectuated by both product design and contractual arrangement, which makes it difficult to apply standard arguments in the antitrust literature such as those concerning exclusive dealing. Although this paper shows that there are considerable private incentives to tie, it also shows that a closed DRM system has ambiguous welfare implications even in this simplified model. In particular, in terms of the continuing policy debate, one must consider the dynamic tradeoff between foreclosing a possibly more efficient rival against duplicating investments that produce similar innovation.
Appendix A
In section 6.1, we made the assumption that a firm cannot stay in the market if it incurs a negative profit in the first period. Basically, this means that firms cannot price below marginal cost in the first period. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing prices to be below marginal cost or negative does not meaningfully change the results in section 6.2. First of all, firm C has no incentive to price the legal content below marginal cost, which is zero, because everyone would buy the legal content at a negative price and the content is a durable good. Instead, if firm C sets ρ = > 0, it can sell the legal content to all consumers at a positive profit. To summarize, when both firms invest under a closed DRM system, firm A's profit is σ A (∆ + h) − R, and firm B's profit is −R. If only firm A invests, its profit is λ − c − R > 0.
Since firm A earns zero profit if it does not invest, investing is a dominant strategy for firm A if σ A > R ∆+h
. In this case, if firm A's dominated strategy is eliminated, then firm B chooses not to invest in equilibrium because its payoff when both firms invest is −R, whereas it can earn a zero profit by not investing. 
